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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF 
WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDERGROUND, 
WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE PRICE 
RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE 
GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE 
PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS 
EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN 
RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, 
Objector and Appellee, 
v. 
JERRY D. OLDS, 
Utah State Engineer and Appellant 
No. 20030156-SC 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this interlocutory appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 78-2-2(3)(J) and 78-2A-3 (2002). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
This appeal presents the following issues: (1) Whether section 73-4-11 of the Utah 
Code can be construed to allow more than 90 days for some water users to file objections 
to the proposed determination when the language of the statute and Utah Supreme Court 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
case law require water users to file objections within 90 days of the date of service, and 
(2) whether objections filed in 1993 and 1999 relate back to the original 1973 objection 
when the subsequent objections are labeled as supplements but raise completely new 
issues and have no common issues of fact, law, or evidence. 
Both are issues of the proper interpretation of sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-10 of the 
Utah Code. 'The interpretation of a statute . . . presents a question of law, which this 
court reviews for correctness." Parks v. Utah Transit Auth., 2002 UT 55, % 4, 53 P.3d 
473; State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, % 12, 52 P.3d 1257. "A 
trial court's determination of the law is reviewed under a correctness standard; we afford 
no degree of deference to a trial judge's determination of the law." United States Fuel 
Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, % 9, 79 P.3d 945 (citations 
omitted). 
Review of these issues is occasioned by the trial court's Memorandum Decision, 
Addendum 1 (R. 439-446), in which the trial court denied the State Engineer's Motion to 
Dismiss (R. 31-32). The State Engineer argued the issues presented here, thereby 
preserving them for review by this court. See Notice, Receipts and Waivers (R. 13, 14); 
Mem. Supp. State Engineer's Mot. Dismiss Green River Canal Company's Objections to 
the Proposed Determination (R. 33-51); Reply Mem. Supp. State Engineer's Mot. 
Dismiss Green River Canal Company's Objections to the Proposed Determination and 
Mem. Opp'n Green River Canal Company's Mot. Extend Time for Filing Protests, or 
Alternatively, Dismiss (R. 157-176); Supplemental Cases and Docs. (R. 329-346); State 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Engineer's Resp. Supplement of Green River Canal Company (R. 347-363); State 
Engineer's Second Supplemental Mem. (R. 427-438); Tr. Hr'g (R. 454: 2-76, 109-139, 
144-156). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The issue in this appeal is the proper interpretation of a portion of section 73-4-11 
of the Utah Code that states: 
After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the 
surveys, records, and files, and after a personal examination of the river 
system or water source involved, if such examination is deemed necessary, 
the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed determination of 
all rights to the use of the water of such river system or water source, and a 
copy of the same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with 
notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from 
such date of mailing file with the clerk of the district court a written 
objection thereto duly verified on oath. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). Section 73-4-10 states: 
The court shall have power to allow amendments to any petition, statement 
or pleading; to extend a provided in this title the time for filing any 
statement of claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing 
any other pleading, statement, report or protest. 
Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BACKGROUND AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Utah and other western states have adopted the prior appropriation doctrine of 
water rights. See Estate of Steed v. New Escalante Irrigation Co., 846 P.2d 1223, 1224 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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(Utah 1994). Under the prior appropriation doctrine, "as between appropriators, the first 
in time shall be the first in rights." Utah Code Ann. § 73-3-1 (1989). A prior 
appropriator is entitled to divert and use its entire water right before water users with later 
priority water rights may divert any water. See Warren Irrigation Co. v. Charlton, 197 P. 
1030, 1032 (1921). At the same time, water rights are limited to the amount that can be 
beneficially used. Utah Code Ann. § 73-1-3 (1989). In an arid state such as Utah, where 
water is almost always scarce, disputes about priorities and quantities are inevitable. 
Without the adjudication statutes, each water user might have to engage in many lawsuits 
against neighboring water users to establish respective water rights. Each water user 
could be plaintiff in many lawsuits and defendant in others. The same issues potentially 
could be tried in different cases, with a possibility of conflicting judicial decrees. To 
mitigate such situations, Utah and most other western states established statutory general 
adjudication procedures so that all water rights within a given river system could be 
adjudicated in a single comprehensive lawsuit. 
In Utah, Title 73 Chapter 4 of the Utah Code sets forth the general adjudication 
procedure. This Court has described the basic procedure as follows: 
As this court recognized in Smith v. District Court, 69 Utah 493, 
498, 256 P. 539, 544 (1927), the purpose of the general adjudication 
process is to prevent piecemeal litigation regarding water rights and to 
provide a permanent record of all such rights by decree. Once the general 
adjudication is initiated, the state engineer is required to give notice to all 
water users of record and to give further notice by publication. Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-4-4. Water users then submit their water user claims, outlining 
their respective claims to the water use. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-5. 
The state engineer prepares a hydrographic survey of the river 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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system and evaluates various water user claims. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-3. 
After a full consideration of the claims, surveys, records, and files, the state 
engineer publishes a proposed determination of water rights. Utah Code 
Ann. § 73-4-11. A copy of the proposed determination is either mailed or 
hand-delivered to each claimant for review. Within ninety days after such 
service, any water user dissatisfied with the proposed determination may 
file an objection with the district court. The court then hears evidence and 
renders judgment on the contested claims. Utah Code Ann. §§ 73-4-13 & -
15. Absent a protest, the district court must enter judgment in accordance 
with the proposed determination. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12. 
Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 289-90 (Utah 1992). 
As this Court described in Jensen, the State Engineer has allowed water users to 
appear in person to obtain a copy of a proposed determination. Id. (noting that Mr. Jensen 
received a copy of an earlier volume of the proposed determination in person); see also 
United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, ^ | 14, 79 
P.3d 945 (agent of water user was served in person with a copy of the proposed 
determination and signed a receipt and consent form); Murdoch v. Springville Mun. 
Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994) (noting that proposed determinations may be 
mailed or hand-delivered to each claimant). To establish the date of service, the water 
user signs a "Notice, Receipt and Waiver" form. See United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, % 
14. The Notice, Receipt and Waiver establishes the date the water user received the 
proposed determination. See Notice, Receipt and Waivers (R. 13,14); Notice, Receipt 
and Waiver for Green River Canal Co., Addendum 2 (R. 13). It notifies the water user 
that any objections to the proposed determination must be filed with the district court 
within ninety days from the date of service. Id. By signing the Notice, Receipt and 
5 
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Waiver form, the water user waives further service in connection with the proposed 
determination and consents to a judgment on the proposed determination unless the water 
user files an objection within ninety days from the date of service. Id. 
The State Engineer mails copies of the proposed determinations to all water users 
who choose not to obtain them in person, then prepares "Affidavits of Mailing" to 
document the date the proposed determinations were mailed to the respective water users. 
See Affidavits of Service by Mailing (R. 16-31). After serving the proposed 
determinations on the water users, the State Engineer compiles the signed Notice, Receipt 
and Waiver forms and the Affidavits of Mailing, and files those documents with the 
district court. See Certificate of Filing (R. 16). The date of service for each water user 
and the waivers of further service by water users who signed the Notice, Receipt and 
Waiver forms become part of the court record. See, e.g., Jensen, 844 P.2d at 290 (noting 
that the affidavits of mailing were part of the court record). 
In Utah, the general water right adjudications take a long time. A number of 
general adjudications, including the Price River general adjudication, have been 
underway for more than twenty years. It may be many years from the time the proposed 
determinations are served until the objections are litigated, appealed, and a final decree is 
entered. Cf. Murdoch, 878 P.2d at 1148 (a lawsuit filed by Salt Lake City in 1936 was 
converted to a general adjudication for the Utah Lake and Jordan River drainage in 1944, 
and was still under way). During the time the general adjudication is in progress, section 
73-4-11 requires the State Engineer to administer the water rights in accordance with the 
6 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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proposed determination (except for previously decreed water rights). Utah Code Ann. § 
73-4-11 (1989). The statute thus provides for the orderly administration of water rights 
during the long pendency of the general adjudication. 
COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
The Fourth Judicial District Court in Duchesne, Utah (now the Eighth Judicial 
District), by order, initiated the general water rights adjudication for the lower Green 
River and its tributaries in Utah, including the Price River, on March 20,1956. See 
Proposed Determination of Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River, Book 
5 at i (R. 1: i). Because that large area was too unwieldy and difficult to adjudicate in one 
proceeding, the court later ordered the Price River general adjudication to be separated 
from the other areas. Id. 
In the Price River general adjudication, the State Engineer notified the water users, 
prepared detailed maps of the entire area (referred to as the hydrographic survey), 
collected the Statements of Water User's Claims from water users, and prepared the 
proposed determination of water rights as directed by section 73-4-3 of the Utah Code. 
See id. (R. 1: i-ii). The Proposed Determination of Water Rights for the Price River 
Drainage was published in six volumes. Books 1 through 5 contained the water rights in 
respective areas of the river drainage, and Book 6 contained supplemental information 
and indices. (R. 1, 2). 
Book 5 of the Proposed Determination contained water rights located in the 
7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vicinity of Green River City, Utah, including Water User's Claim 91-294, a water right 
owned by Green River Canal Company (Company). Addendum! 3 (R. 1: 1143). Water 
User's Claim 91-294 was recognized in the Proposed Determination Book 5 with an 
irrigation duty of four acre-feet per acre per year, a flow of 60 cubic feet per second 
(c.f.s.) for irrigation of 1,443.50 acres and stock water during the irrigation season, and 20 
c.f.s. for stock water during the non-irrigation season. Id. The Proposed Determination 
Book 5 also contained the following notice: 
Pursuant to Section 73-4-11 U.C.A. 1953, you are hereby notified 
that any claimant dissatisfied with said Proposed Determination must file 
with the Clerk of the above entitled Court a written objection thereto duly 
verified on oath within ninety (90) days from and after the date of service of 
this Proposed Determination upon you. 
(R. 1: notice page); see also Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) (directing the State 
Engineer to give notice of the requirements for filing objections). 
On December 15, 1972, Delbert Tidwell, the Company secretary, signed a Notice, 
Receipt and Waiver acknowledging receipt of the Proposed Determination for the Price 
River and Lower Green River Drainage, Area Code 91, Books 5 and 6. Notice, Receipt 
and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13: (alphabetical under Green River Canal Company)). The 
Notice, Receipt and Waiver documents the date of service to the Company, notifies the 
Company in two separate sections that any objections must be filed within ninety days 
from the date of service, and concludes with the following statement waiving further 
service by mail and consenting to a decree unless a protest to the proposed determination 
is filed within ninety days: 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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And the undersigned waives any further service in connection 
therewith [to the Proposed Determination] and consents to the 
entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is 
made by the undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court 
within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof. [Dated 
and signed.] 
Id. The Company therefore had until March 15, 1973, to file objections. 





First 1993 Objection 
(Addendum 5) 






June 20, 1973 
(97 days late) 
June 18,1993 
(20 years and 95 days late) 
June 18,1993 
(20 years and 95 days late) 
October 14, 1999 
(26 years and 212 days 
late) 
, SUBJECT 
Increase irrigation duty 
from 4 to 5 acre feet per 
acre per year 
Increase irrigation duty 
from 4 to 6 acre feet per 
acre per year 
Disallow Green River City 
hydro-power water right 
Increase irrigation season 
flow from 60 c.f.s. to 80 
c.f.s. 
On June 20, 1973, ninety-seven days after the end of the statutory ninety-day 
objection period, the Company filed an objection (1973 Objection) contending the 
irrigation duty granted in the Proposed Determination Book 5 should be changed from 
four acre-feet per acre per year to five acre-feet per acre per year. Addendum 4 (R. 3). 
On June 18, 1993, twenty years and ninety-five days after the end of the statutory 
9 
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ninety-day objection period, the Company filed two additional objections. One (First 
1993 Objection) again raised the issue of irrigation duty as addressed in the 1973 
Objection, asserting that the irrigation duty should be increased from four to six acre feet 
per acre per year. Addendum 5 (R. 4). 
Also on June 18, 1993, the Company filed another objection (Second 1993 
Objection). In the Second 1993 Objection, the Company asserted that water right 91-39, 
a hydro-power water right owned by Green River City, should be disallowed because it 
had been forfeited for non-use. Addendum 6 (R. 5). 
On October 14, 1999, twenty-six years and 212 days after the end of the statutory 
ninety-day objection period, the Company filed an objection (1999 Objection), which it 
captioned "Supplemental Protest by Green River Canal Company to the Proposed 
Determination of Water Rights." Addendum 7 (R. 6). In the 1999 Objection, the 
Company asserted that Water User's Claim 91-294 should have been recognized for 80 
c.f.s during the irrigation season rather than 60 c.f.s. Id. This is the objection at issue in 
this litigation and appeal.1 
1
 The 1973 Objection and the first 1993 Objection are now moot because the State 
Engineer published an addendum with revised irrigation duties for the Price River 
drainage. The Company could resolve the Second 1993 Objection at any time by filing a 
private action for forfeiture of the Green River City water right outside the general 
adjudication. In addition, the Company filed an Application to Appropriate additional 
water if it does not succeed on the 1999 Objection. (R. 342-343). The Company is 
seeking by this action to gain the additional water at an earlier priority than the adjacent 
water user, Mr. Thayn. (R. 368). The dispute with Mr. Thayn was the subject of the case 
Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, 486 Utah Adv. Rep 34. See 1999 
Objection and its Exhibit A, Addendum 7 (R. 10-12). 
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When discussions to resolve the issue raised in the 1999 Objection proved 
fruitless, the State Engineer filed a motion to dismiss all four Company Objections 
because the Company did not file them within ninety days after it received the Proposed 
Determination, as required by section 73-4-11. (R. 31, 33). In response, the Company 
filed a memorandum opposing dismissal on grounds of laches, waiver, equal protection, 
uniform operation of laws, and default. (R. 58, 69-73). The Company also filed a motion 
to either extend the objection period to include its objections, or to dismiss the entire 
Price River and Lower Green River general adjudication proceedings. (R. 55, 64-69, 74-
78). Both parties filed response and reply memoranda and supplemental memoranda as 
directed by the trial court. (R. 157, 186, 328, 346, 363, 395). The trial court held a 
hearing on June 14, 2002. (R. 396). After the hearing, the parties submitted 
supplemental memoranda as directed by the trial court. (R. 426, 438). 
DISPOSITION IN THE TRIAL COURT 
On February 7, 2003, the trial court issued the "Memorandum Decision on Utah 
State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss and Claimant Green River Canal Company's Motion 
to Dismiss and/or Extend Time for Filing Objections" (Memorandum Decision). 
Addendum 1 (R. 439). In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court denied the State 
Engineer's motion to dismiss the objections. Id. at 5 (R. 443). The court expressed 
concern that not all water users had received their proposed determinations at the same 
time, id. at 2, 4 (R. 440,442), reasoning that water users who received the proposed 
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determination at a later date had an advantage over water users who received it earlier, id. 
at 4 (R. 442). The court believed that the legislature intended all water users to receive 
the proposed determination "almost contemporaneously," and for this reason intended 
service under section 73-4-11 to be by mail. Id. The trial court concluded that "[i]f all 
objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all claimants should have 90 days to 
present their objections under 73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed 
using the date of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is on file herein 
which affects each area." Id. at 4-5 (R. 442-43). The last Notice, Receipt and Waiver 
form was signed by Joseph Novak on June 4, 1974.2 Id. at 5 (R. 443). The trial court 
held that the 1973 Objection was therefore timely. Id. 
The trial court reasoned that the State Engineer's "decision not to comply strictly 
with the statutory language" gave the trial court "legal latitude" for its decision. Id. The 
trial court also reasoned it had "equitable grounds" because of the State Engineer's delay 
in filing the motion to dismiss. Id. The court then stated it was "further treating the 
'supplemental filings' by that company as merely amendments and/or specifications to the 
original filing." Id. Because the 1973 objection was filed "before 90 days after June 4, 
1974," the court held that all four objections were timely. Id. Finally, the trial court 
denied the Company's motion to dismiss the entire Price River and Lower Green River < 
2
 Joseph Novak is a prominent water attorney who practices in Salt Lake City. He 
is not listed as a water right owner in the alphabetical index in the Proposed 
Determination Book 6. The trial court probably was unaware that Mr. Novak was not 
actually a water user. 
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general adjudication, and denied "the Canal Company's request for additional time to file 
claims except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the statutory scheme allows 
additional time to file the objection herein." Id. at 5-6 (R. 443-44). In denying the 
Company's motion for extension of time to file objections, the trial court made no finding 
of "due cause" required by the extension provision in section 73-4-10. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court erred when it interpreted section 73-4-11 to allow water users to file 
objections until ninety days after the last date of service of any copy of a proposed 
determination in the Price River general adjudication. Water users who voluntarily 
receive their proposed determination in person and who expressly waive further service of 
the proposed determination may file objections within ninety days from the date they are 
individually served. The plain language of section 73-4-11 and Utah case law require that 
the objection period for each individual ends ninety days after that individual is served a 
copy of the proposed determination. 
Section 73-4-12 provides that a water right that is uncontested at the end of the 
ninety-day objection period must be decreed in accordance with the proposed 
determination. United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 
49, ^ | 15, 79 P.3d 945. While section 73-4-10 allows the trial court to grant extensions for 
filing objections, the only way to reconcile sections 73-4-10. II, anc s if the trial 
court can grant extensions only when the motion for extension is filed before the end of 
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the statutory ninety-day objection period. 
There are sound policy reasons for the way the legislature established this statutory 
framework. Ending the objection period after ninety days allows water users time to 
investigate and file objections, while imparting security to water rights and stability to 
river systems after the objection period has ended. On the other hand, if the objection 
period doesn't expire until after the last proposed determination is served, or if the trial 
court can extend it retroactively, then there is no security or stability. Instead, no one 
knows in advance when the objection period actually ends, and no one knows which 
objections are timely until the trial court decides when the objection period ended. 
A water user cannot circumvent the statutory ninety-day objection period in section 
73-4-11 simply by calling a late objection a supplement or amendment to an earlier 
objection. The court should look at the substance of the later objections, not the label. If 
a later objection is not the same as the timely objection in its subject matter, legal issues, 
and factual issues, it is a late objection and should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE NINETY-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD IN SECTION 73-4-11 CANNOT 
BE RETROACTIVELY EXTENDED OR MODIFIED 
A. WHEN WATER USERS CHOOSE PERSONAL SERVICE OF THE 
PROPOSED DETERMINATION AND EXPRESSLY WAIVE 
SERVICE BY MAIL, THE OBJECTION PERIOD BEGINS TO RUN 
ON THE DATE OF INDIVIDUAL SERVICE 
The trial court held that the objection period "should be computed using the date of 
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the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is on file herein which affects 
each area." Memorandum Decision at 4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 442-43). The trial court held 
that this date was June 14, 1974. Id. at 5 (R. 443). This ruling is in error because the 
objection period for the Company began to run when the Company received the Proposed 
Determination Books 5 and 6 on December 15, 1972, 
Section 73-4-11 of the Utah Code states that the State Engineer "shall formulate a 
report and a proposed determination . . . and a copy of the same shall be mailed by regular 
mail to each claimant with a notice that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within 
ninety days from such date of mailing file . . . a written objection thereto." Utah Code 
Ann. §73-4-11 (1989). 
As described above, the State Engineer has allowed water users who choose to do 
so to receive proposed determinations in person. On December 15,1972, the secretary for 
the Company received copies of the Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 and signed a 
Notice, Receipt and Waiver. Notice, Receipt and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13: 
(alphabetical under Green River Canal Co.)). In the Notice, Receipt and Waiver, the 
Company acknowledged receipt of the proposed determination and waived further service 
by mail. Id. The Notice, Receipt and Waiver stated, "And the undersigned waives any 
further service in connection [with the proposed determination] and consents to the entry 
of a final decree in this cause unless a formal protest is made by the undersigned claimant 
to the above-entitled court within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof" Id; cf. 
Beggs v. Myton Canal & Irrigation Co., 179 P. 984, 987 (Utah 1919) (shareholders in 
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irrigation company may waive their statutory rights of notice of shareholders' meeting); 
Badger v. Madsen, 896 P.2d 20, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (same). 
The United States Supreme Court addressed personal service and service by mail 
inMullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950). Although 
Mullane addressed service of notice in the context of due process, the Court's discussion 
of the hierarchy of methods of service and its reasoning are instructive. The Court held 
that personal service is best, stating, "Personal service of written notice within the 
jurisdiction is the classic form of notice always adequate in any type of proceeding." 
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313; see also id. at 320. Notice by mail is permissible in some 
situations, id. at 319, and in a few circumstances, service by publication in a newspaper is 
allowable, id. at 320. Personal service of proposed determinations therefore affords a 
higher form of service than service by mail. By this standard, the State Engineer has 
traditionally exceeded the requirements of section 73-4-11, and did so in this case. 
Acknowledging the efficacy of personal service, water users who received personal 
service waived service by mail by signing the Notice, Receipt and Waiver forms. (R. 13, 
14). 
The Company received its Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 on December 
15, 1972. The Company's decision to receive its volumes of the Proposed Determination 
by personal service was completely voluntary. The Company representative signed the 
Notice, Receipt and Waiver form in which the Company expressly waived further service 
i 
of the Proposed Determination Books 5 and 6 and consented to entry of a decree in 
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accordance with the Proposed Determination unless it filed a written objection with the 
clerk of court within ninety days after the date of service. Notice, Receipt and Waiver, 
Addendum 2 (R. 13). Under these circumstances, the ninety-day objection period began 
to run on the date of service to the Company. The Company did not file an objection 
within ninety days from the date it received its Proposed Determinations. All of the 
Company's objections were therefore late, in violation of section 73-4-11, and the trial 
court erred by not granting the State Engineer's motion to dismiss the objections. 
THE NINETY-DAY OBJECTION PERIOD APPLIES TO EACH 
WATER USER INDIVIDUALLY 
Regarding the construction of statutes, this Court has said: 
In interpreting statutes, our paramount concern is to give effect to the 
legislative intent, manifested by the plain language of the statute. Unless a 
statute is ambiguous, we will not look beyond the plain language of the 
statute. In doing so, we "presume that the legislature used each word 
advisedly and [we] give effect to the term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning," and we "seek 4to render all parts [of the statute] 
relevant and meaningful."' 
State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75,1 13, 52 P.3d 1257 (alterations 
in original) (citations omitted). 
The trial court held that the objection period ended ninety days after the last 
claimant received its copies of the proposed determination (R. 440,443), allowing water 
users such as the Company more than ninety days to file objections (the Company had 
626 days). The trial court erred, however, because the statute does not allow more than 
ninety days for individual water users to file objections. 
r 7 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The plain language of section 73-4-11 allows each water user ninety days from the 
date of service to file objections. Referring to section 73-4-11, this Court has stated, "By 
the plain language of the statute, [the water user] had ninety days from the date of service 
of the proposed determination to file an objection to the proposed award of water rights to 
[the other water user]." United States Fuel Co, v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 
2003 UT 49, f 17,79 P.3d 945. 
Section 73-4-11 requires the State Engineer to mail (or serve) a copy of the 
proposed determination on "each claimant" with notice that "any claimant" may file an 
objection within ninety days. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). The words "each" 
and "any" make the service and deadline specific to each claimant without reference to 
others. See Black's Law Dictionary 266 (abridged 5th ed. 1983). The ninety day 
objection period therefore ends for each claimant ninety days after that individual 
claimant was served. The statute does not provide an objection period that is independent 
of the date of service to the individual water user, or an objection period that ends ninety 
days after a different water user is served. If the legislature had intended the objection 
period to run for ninety days from the date the last water user in an area is served, it 
would have so stated. Instead, the plain language of the statute provides a ninety day 
objection period based on the date of service to each individual water user. 
By the plain language of the statute, the Company had ninety days from the date it 
was served with the proposed determination to file any objections. See United States 
Fuel, 2003 UT 49, f 17. The trial court erred when it ruled that the objection period for 
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the Company did not begin to run until Joseph Novak was served on June 4, 1974. 
I AH SUPREME COURT CASE LAW PREVENTS LATE 
OBJECTIONS FROM BEING LITIGATED IN THE GENERAL 
ADJUDICATION 
The present case fits into a line of Utah Supreme Court cases that addresses 
whether water users can litigate issues that were settled by the proposed determination 
and were not raised in a timely objection. The question in this case is whether failure to 
file a timely objection bars a water user from litigating an issue settled by the proposed 
determination < HI whether the water user can simply file a late objection to raise the issue 
and litigate it within the general adjudication. 
In United States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, 79 
P.3d 945, this Court held that Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) must be read in 
conjunction with section 73-4-12,3 which requires the trial court to enter a judgment in 
accordance with the proposed determination for water rights that are uncontested at the 
end of the statutory ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11. Utah Code Ann. § 
73-4-12 (1989); United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, f 15. In United States Fuel, the 
Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co. (HCIC) and United States Fuel Co. (USF) both 
claimed water rights from Cedar Creek in the Huntington Creek drainage. The HCIC 
3
 Section 73-4-12 states in relevant part, "If no contest on the part of any claimant 
shall have been filed, the court shall render a judgment in accordance with such proposed 
determination, which shall determine and establish the rights of the several claimants to 
the use of the water of said river system or water source . . " Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-12 
(1989). 
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water right had an earlier priority than the USF water rights. United States Fuel, 2003 UT 
49, % 3. The water rights were published in the Proposed Determination of Water Rights 
for the San Rafael River drainage. Id. USF's representative was served a proposed 
determination and signed a receipt and consent form, id. at U 4, similar to the Notice, 
Receipt and Waiver form signed by a representative of the Company in the present case, 
see Notice, Receipt and Waiver, Addendum 2 (R. 13). USF filed an objection ninety-one 
days later. United States Fuel 2003 UT 49, % 4. Several years later, USF filed an action 
in district court seeking to quiet title to certain water rights and to determine the priorities 
of the water rights. After a trial, the court found in favor of USF. Id. at % 8. 
On appeal, this Court vacated the trial court decision, holding that section 73-4-12 
requires the trial court to enter a decree on all water rights that were not contested when 
the statutory ninety-day objection period expired. Id. at J 15. "The clear mandate of 
section 73-4-12 is that courts must render judgment in accordance with a proposed 
determination where the proposed determination is uncontested at the close of the ninety-
day statutory period." Id. If the water user files a timely objection, the water user can 
pursue the claim within the general adjudication or through an expedited proceeding 
pursuant to section 73-4-24. Id. at ^  18. Because the issues were settled by the proposed 
determination, USF could not pursue its claims in a private action outside the general 
adjudication. Id.; accord Hicken v. North Field Ditch Co., No. 960360-CA (Utah Ct. 
App. Mar. 20, 1997) (unpublished memorandum decision), Addendum 8. 
The same reasoning applies within the general adjudication. It would make no 
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sense if a water user with a water right that was uncontested at the end of the statutory 
objection period is entitled to "judgment in accordance with the proposed determination" 
against another water user who seeks to attack the water right outside the adjudication, 
but has no defense and no right to "judgment in accordance with the proposed 
determination" against the same opposing water user who files a late objection and 
pursues it within the general adjudication. If section 73-4-12 means that the trial court 
must enter a judgment in accordance with the proposed determination for water rights that 
are uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day objection period, it applies whether 
the late attack comes as part of the general adjudication or collaterally. 
In Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287 (Utah 1994), this Court held that a water user 
could not maintain an action pursuant to section 73-4-24 unless that action was based on a 
timely objection. A section 24 adjudication action expedites the hearing of a valid 
objection.4 Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 (1989); see United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, % 18; 
Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). It would make no 
sense to bar a section 24 action for lack of a timely objection, but allow an non-expedited 
action within the regular general adjudication proceedings based on the same late or 
defective objection. 
Earlier case law from this Court stated this long-standing principle: "[I]f the 
Section 73-4-24 allows water users to litigate an issue between fewer than all the 
parties. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-24 (1989). After the Proposed Determination is 
published, section 73-4-24 allows water users to expedite hearing of a valid, timely 
objection. Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994)). 
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claimant makes no objection, he, by his silence, does in legal effect precisely what every 
other person who is sued and makes default does, namely, confesses the statements 
contained in the engineer's proposed determination of his water rights, and thus a 
judgment may legally be entered in accordance with the proposed determination of the 
engineer." Eden Irrigation Co. v. Dist. Court, 211 P. 957, 960 (Utah 1922). This Court 
explained, "This is no more than entering a default judgment after a party by his silence 
has confessed the allegation of the complaint." Id; United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, % 20 
("When USF failed to timely contest HCIC's claim to the 10.0 cfs of Cedar Creek water, 
it took on the status of a defaulting party in the general adjudication."); Green River 
Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2°03 UT 50,1} 29, 486 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 ("[T]he State Engineer's 
decisions in a general adjudication or pursuant to a proposed determination are binding 
upon the parties unless and until a party files a timely objection to the proposed 
determination."). The United States Fuel, Jensen, Green River Canal Co., and Eden 
Irrigation Co. decisions hold water right owners responsible to file objections within the 
statutory ninety-day period. If they do not, they take on the status of a defaulting party, 
effectively consenting to a decree pursuant to section 73-4-12. 
In United States Fuel, this Court alluded to the question of whether the trial court 
in a general adjudication can allow litigation of an untimely objection. See United States 
Fuel, 2003 UT 49, ffij 18, 20 (the general adjudication is the proper forum for USF to 
"seek relief for its untimely-filed objection"). However, the Court's statements directing 
the parties to seek relief in the general adjudication do not imply that the trial court has 
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discretion to modify or retroactively extend the objection period to more than ninety days. 
Rather, this i >urt recognized that the trial court in the general adjudication was the 
proper court to rule on the validity of the objection. If there is a question about whether 
an objection is actually late, the water user can present its case to the general adjudication 
trial court - for example, if the ninety days ended on a weekend or legal hohda 
United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, fflj 17, 18, 20. However, if the objection is found to be 
late, the effect of sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 must be the same whether the action is 
pursued within or outside the general adjudication. 
Jensen precludes a section 73-4-24 adjudication, which is an expedited hearing of 
an objection within the adjudication, unless it is based on a timely objection, and United 
States Fuel precludes a separate action outside the adjudication that is not based on a 
timely objection. If a water user such as Mr. Jensen or USF who is blocked by these 
cases only has to file a late objection in the general adjudication to circumvent those 
rulings, then the discussions in both cases about lack of a timely objection and the 
discussion in United States Fuel about section 73-4-12 are only dicta. Both cases would 
simply designate the proper forum, and the reasoning supporting the decisions would be 
incorrect. Such an outcome would render the ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-
11 meaningless. 
D. SECTION 73-4-10 ALLOWS PROSPECTIVE BUT NOT 
RETROACTIVE EXTENSIONS 
When construing statutes, this Court has said that "statutory enactments are to be 
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so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful." Millet v. Clark 
Clinic Corp., 609 P.2d 934, 936 (Utah 1980); see also Hall v. Utah State Dep 't of 
Corrections, 2001 UT 34, % 15, 24 P.3d 958. The Court strives to avoid "interpretations 
that will render portions of a statute superfluous or inoperative." Hall, 2001 UT 34, ^.15. 
Section 73-4-10 allows the trial court to extend time for filing any "protest" upon a 
showing of "due cause." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989).5 The Company relied on 
section 73-4-10 in seeking a retroactive extension of time to cover its late objections. It 
filed its motion for an extension in December 2000 in response to the State Engineer's 
motion to dismiss all of the Company's objections. The trial court denied the motion for 
extension under section 73-4-10 and made no findings of due cause as required by that 
section. (R. 443-44). 
The State Engineer does not dispute that the trial court has authority under proper 
circumstances to extend the time for filing an objection under section 73-4-10 if the 
motion is filed before the end of the ninety-day objection period. However, the trial court 
does not have authority to grant an extension if the water user fails to file a motion for an 
extension within ninety days from the date of service of the proposed determination. 
Section 73-4-11 and the extension provision in section 73-4-10 must be read together to 
give effect to both. The ninety-day limit in section 73-4-11 becomes superfluous and 
5
 Section 73-4-10 states: "The court shall have power to allow amendments to any 
petition, statement, or pleading; to extend as provided in this title the time for filing any 
statement of claim; and to extend, upon due cause shown, the time for filing any other 
pleading, statement, report, or protest." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). 
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inoperative if trial courts can grant extensions retroactively. 
This statutory scheme has parallels elsewhere in the Utah statutes. For example, 
sections 63-30-11 and 63-30-12 of the Utah Code are analogous to sections 73-4-11 and 
73-4-12. Section 63-30-12 states that a claim against the state "is barred unless notice of 
claim is filed with the attorney general and within one year after the claim arises." Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-12 (Supp. 2003). There is also an extension provision, section 63-
30-11, similar to the extension provision in section 73-4-10, that allows the trial court to 
extend the time for filing the notice of claim, but does not specify whether retroactive 
extensions are available. Id. § 63-30-11(4). Interpreting these statutes together, this 
Court has held that the trial courts do not have jurisdiction to hear the case unless the 
complaining party files the notice of claim before the one year deadline or the deadline as 
prospectively extended. See Yearsley v. Jensen, 798 P.2d 1127, 1129 (Utah 1990) (notice 
of claim filed one day late resulted in dismissal); see also Nielson v. Gurley, 888 P.2d 
130, 135 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) ("Complying with the notice provisions of the 
Governmental Immunity Act is a jurisdictional requirement and a precondition to suit.. . 
."); Lamarr v. Utah State Dep 't ofTransp., 828 P.2d 535, 540 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(notice of claim provision is not a statute of limitation, but "is a jurisdictional requirement 
and a precondition to suit"). These cases hold that retroactive extensions are unavailable 
because the trial court loses jurisdiction at the expiration of the notice period. Section 63-
30-11 allows extensions when the motion for extension is filed before the expiration of 
the one year deadline, but it does not permit retroactive extensions. 
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Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure also has an analogous 
jurisdictional deadline. Rule 4 requires a party seeking to appeal a final order to file a 
notice of appeal with the clerk of the trial court within 30 days after entry of the 
judgment. Utah R. App. P. 4(a) (2002). The trial court may grant an extension "upon a 
showing of excusable neglect or good cause," but the motion for the extension must be 
filed not later than 30 days after the expiration of the original 30-day period. Id. 4(e). 
The rule thus establishes two deadlines. The first may be extended by motion filed either 
before the first deadline or within 30 days after the first deadline. After the second 30 day 
deadline, however, the trial court cannot grant a motion for an extension because lateness 
is a jurisdictional defect. See Glezos v. Frontier Invs., 896 P.2d 1230, 1232-34 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1995) (court had no jurisdiction to hear cross appeal because the notice of cross 
appeal was not filed timely and the cross-appellant did not file a timely motion for an 
extension). 
Like section 63-30-12 and Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, 
section 73-4-11 is jurisdictional and establishes a firm deadline for filing objections to the 
proposed determination. If the water user moves for an extension before the end of the 
statutory ninety-day objection period, the trial court may grant the extension "upon due 
cause shown." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). After the objection period expires, 
however, the trial court may not grant an extension retroactively. Otherwise, the statutory 
ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11 and the judgment provision in section 73-
4-12 are superfluous and inoperative, only enforceable at the discretion of the trial court. 
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E. THE COMPANY'S EQUITABLE ARGUMENTS DO NOT JUSTIFY 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 73-4-11 
OR SATISFY THE DUE CAUSE REQUIREMENT IN SECTION 73-
4-10 
The Company argued that the State Engineer's motion to dismiss was barred by the 
equitable doctrines of laches and waiver. (R. 69-73). The Company also used its 
arguments in support of laches and waiver as support for its argument that it met the due 
cause standard in section 73-4-10. (R. 64). The trial court apparently considered the 
Company's equitable arguments when it interpreted section 73-4-11. Memorandum 
Decision at 4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 442-43). 
The trial court erred in considering equitable arguments to interpret section 73-4-
11. First, the plain language of the statute controls, and the trial court's interpretation is 
contrary to the plain language of the statute, as discussed above. Second, any authority 
the trial court might have to relieve a water user from strict compliance with the ninety-
day objection period comes only from section 73-4-10, not from a generalized authority to 
exercise discretion regarding the procedural aspects of the general adjudication. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-4-3 (1989) ("In all such cases the court shall proceed to determine the 
water rights involved in the manner provided by this chapter, and not otherwise."). The 
trial court therefore erred by considering the Company's equitable arguments in its 
interpretation of section 73-4-11, and the Company's arguments that the equitable 
doctrines of laches and waiver bar the State Engineer's motion to dismiss fail for the 
same reason. 
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The Company's arguments that it met the due cause standard in section 73-4-11 
also fail because the trial court has no discretion to allow retroactive extensions of the 
ninety-day objection period. The trial court properly denied the motion for an extension 
and made no finding regarding the "due cause" standard. However, even if the trial court 
did have discretion to grant an extension retroactively under section 73-4-10, the 
Company did not demonstrate "due cause" as the statute requires. The Company offered 
no evidence or explanation of any circumstances to justify or excuse its late filing of the 
1973 Objection or any of the other objections. It offered no explanation why it waited 
until 2000, when the State Engineer filed the motion to dismiss, before it filed its motion 
for extension. The Company's primary argument was that some evidence that might have 
excused the late filing might have existed at some time, but the Company cannot now find 
it. (R. 454: 102-103; 65-73; 187; 193-195). The Company conceded it was unable to 
defend itself against the motion to dismiss, arguing instead that its inability to gather 
evidence was because the State Engineer had delayed filing the motion to dismiss. (R. 
64-7la). However, under any standard, the Company bore the burden of demonstrating 
that it had due cause for filing the objections late. The Company also bears the 
responsibility to protect its own interests through the course of the general adjudication, 
including retaining evidence that might have excused the late filing, if such evidence 
existed. At any time after filing the 1973 Objection, the Company could have sought 
resolution of its objection by filing a petition pursuant to section 73-4-24. See United 
States Fuel Co. v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co., 2003 UT 49, f 18, 79 P.3d 945; 
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Murdoch v. Springville Mun. Corp., 878 P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). The Company 
chose not to do so, and it cannot now blame the State Engineer for the consequences. 
Any delay was as much a product of the Company's own decisions as the State 
Engineer's actions. 
The Company also argued that the State Engineer responded differently to other 
objections, and that the trial court should therefore overlook the lateness of the 
Company's objections. (R. 71-71a, 229-30, 454: 86-91). There is, however, no 
relationship between the State Engineer's response to other objections in 2000 and the 
Company's late filing in 1973. The "due cause" standard must relate to the circumstances 
of the filing of the 1973 Objection or the other objections, not unrelated events that 
occurred much later. 
In the Memorandum Decision, the trial court was concerned because water users 
were served proposed determinations on different days some time apart. Memorandum 
Decision at 2,4-5, Addendum 1 (R. 440, 442-43). The Company argued that water users 
who receive copies of the proposed determination later have an advantage over those who 
receive them earlier. (R. 454: 61,442). It argued that for this reason, the ninety-day 
objection period should not begin to run until all claimants have received copies of the 
proposed determination. Memorandum Decision at 2, Addendum 1 (R. 440). This 
construction of section 73-4-11 infers into the statute a requirement that all water users 
receive the proposed determination "almost contemporaneously." Id. at 4 (R. 442). 
However, this Court has said that it is improper to infer terms into a statute, stating, 
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"Indeed, we will not infer substantive terms into the text that are not already there. 
Rather, the interpretation must be based on the language used, and [we have] no power to 
rewrite the statute to conform to an intention that is not expressed.'" AGC v. Board of 
Oil Gas and Mining, 2001 UT 112, % 30, 38 P.2d 291 (alterations in original) (quoting 
Berrett v. Purser & Edwards, 876 P.2d 367, 370 (Utah 1994)). There is no statutory 
requirement for contemporaneous service, and it was improper to infer that requirement 
into the statute. 
In any case, there is no advantage or disadvantage to receiving a proposed 
determination earlier or later than another water user, because all water users affected by 
an objection are allowed to participate in its resolution. See Plain City Irrigation Co. v. 
Hooper Irrigation Co., 51 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1935). Water users can protect their 
interests by participating in the resolution of the objection and do not need to file a 
"counter-objection." 
When all the company's arguments are considered carefully, they do not constitute 
due cause. Neither the Company's speculation nor anything the State Engineer did or did 
not do after the fact justifies the Company's failure to file its objections timely. 
F. THE LEGISLATURE HAD SOUND REASONS FOR THE 
STATUTORY FRAMEWORK OF THE GENERAL 
ADJUDICATION 
Sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 work together to give a degree of security and 
stability to water rights during the time between publication of the proposed 
30 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
determination and entry of the final decree. Section 73-4-11 requires that objections must 
be filed within ninety days from the date of service of the proposed determination on the 
respective water user. Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11; see United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, 
DTI 19, 20, 79 P.3d 945; Green River Canal Co. v. Thayn, 2003 UT 50, f| 29, 31, 486 
Utah Adv. Rep. 34; Jensen v. Morgan, 844 P.2d 287, 291 (Utah 1992). It also requires 
the State Engineer to administer water rights "in accordance with the proposed 
determination," or in accordance with an earlier decree for decreed water rights. Utah 
Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989). Section 73-4-12 reinforces the statutory ninety-day 
objection period by requiring the trial court to enter a judgment in accordance with the 
proposed determination for water rights that are uncontested at the end of the statutory 
ninety-day objection period. See id. § 73-4-12; United States Fuel, 2003 UT 49, ffl[ 18-
20. 
One purpose of the general adjudication is to "make a permanent record of existing 
rights." Provo River Water Users s Ass yn v. Morgan, 857 P.2d 927, 935 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). This Court stated that "the basic goal of general adjudication i s to 
record all water claims from a particular source which subsequent appropriators can rely 
upon before making their investments.'" Id. (quoting Robert W. Swenson, A Primer of 
Utah Water Law: Part II, 6 J. Energy L. & Pol'y 1, 29 (1985)). The final decree must 
have a "degree of finality and solidarity," id. (quoting Green River Adjudication v. United 
States, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (Utah 1965)), and "collateral attacks should be discouraged," 
id. (citing Swenson at 34). 
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The same rationale applies to the finality of the statutory ninety-day objection 
period. The decree for a particular area cannot be entered until all of the objections are 
litigated to a final resolution. That may be many years, or even decades. During that 
interim time, water rights that were uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day 
objection period should not be subject to a constant threat, extending to the day a decree 
is entered, that any water user could at any time file a late objection. 
If the ninety-day objection period is respected, water users can rely on water rights 
that are uncontested at the end of the statutory ninety-day objection period as having a 
certain level of security. Water users can determine which objections have been filed and 
which issues have been raised, knowing that water rights are safe from a direct attack by 
other water users who did not file timely objections, and make decisions accordingly. 
They would also know that other water users cannot file late objections to expand water 
rights that compete for the same water. Water users and lenders can feel confident about 
investments based on the water rights. Buyers and sellers can inform themselves about 
the strengths and weaknesses of water rights and act accordingly. 
This stability, based on a hierarchy of water rights by priority, extends throughout 
the stream system. The State Engineer can administer the water rights for the entire 
system as required by section 73-4-11. See Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989) (State 
Engineer shall administer water rights in accordance with the proposed determination 
until the decree is entered). Water users and the State Engineer can rely on the priorities, 
amounts, diversion points, and other characteristics of the water rights, as established in 
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the proposed determination, when considering change applications and other transactions. 
In contrast, an open-ended objection period, or one that could be retroactively 
extended at any time, would mean that no individual water rights and no collective 
systems of water rights would be secure from a direct attack by another water user. They 
could also be subject to an indirect attack in which competing water rights are enlarged at 
the expense of others on the system. An open-ended objection period would inevitably 
change the way water rights are regarded and administered in Utah. 
If the trial court can extend or re-define the statutory ninety-day objection period, it 
disrupts the statutory scheme established by the legislature. The notice required by 
section 73-4-11 "that any claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from 
such day of mailing file . . . a written objection," Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-11 (1989), 
would be untrue on its face. An open-ended objection period would cause an already 
long process to become interminable, because litigation of a single late objection could 
extend the adjudication many years, and another would extend it for years more. 
The Memorandum Decision creates a problem that is particularly acute. No one 
can predict at the outset when the last person in an area will be served. No one would 
know in advance when the objections are actually due if the trial court has discretion to 
set the due date retroactively from far in the future. The State Engineer and other water 
users would never know which objections are late because the trial court could at any 
time extend the objection period to allow any or all late objections. 
It is unfortunate that general adjudications take so long. However, the legislature 
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has established a statutory framework that provides security for water users during the 
time the adjudication is proceeding. The statutory ninety-day objection period is a crucial 
part of that framework, and this Court should uphold it by not allowing late objections or 
retroactive extensions of the objection period. 
II. SECTION 73-4-11 DOES NOT ALLOW LATE OBJECTIONS TO BE 
CONSIDERED AMENDMENTS OR SUPPLEMENTS OF A TIMELY 
OBJECTION UNLESS THEY ARE CLOSELY RELATED TO THE 
TIMELY OBJECTION 
If the 1973 Objection is found to be timely, this case raises the question of when a 
late objection is a supplement to a timely objection, and when it is actually a new 
objection barred by the ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11. It requires the 
Court to examine the substance of objections rather than labels. 
A major reason for the statutory time limit for filing objections is so water users * 
have notice of issues that affect their water rights. "Supplemental" or "amended" 
objections that raise new issues subvert this purpose in the same way and for the same 
reasons as late objections in general, and they cause the same problems for water rights 
and for the general adjudication. Sections 73-4-11 and 73-4-12 bar new issues raised 
after the ninety-day objection period, whether those issues are raised in a late objection or 
a late objection masquerading as a "supplement" or "amendment" to a timely objection. 
Otherwise, a cunning water user - and they are out there - could simply file an empty 
objection titled "objection" and fill it with issues as the years roll by. 
Section 73-4-10 gives the trial court "power to allow amendments to any petition, 
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statement, or pleading." Utah Code Ann. § 73-4-10 (1989). The list of amendable 
filings, however, does not include "objection" or "protest." Id. At most, the statutes 
allow water users to supplement timely objections by offering additional supporting 
evidence. 
In this case, even if the 1973 Objection were timely, the trial court erred when it 
allowed the Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection to relate back in time to the 
original 1973 Objection. The Second 1993 Objection (disputing the Green River City 
water right), Addendum 6, and the 1999 Objection (claiming the flow right should be 
increased by 20 c.f.s. to a total of 80 c.f.s.), Addendum 7, are completely unrelated to the 
1973 Objection (requesting an irrigation duty of five acre feet per acre rather than four), 
Addendum 4. While the First 1993 Objection (requesting an irrigation duty of six acre-
feet per acre), Addendum 5, expanded on the issue raised by the 1973 Objection, the 
Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection raised new issues completely unrelated to 
the 1973 Objection. The trial court accepted the later objections as "merely amendments 
and/or specifications to the original filing." Memorandum Decision at 5, Addendum 1 
(R. 443). However, the 1973 Objection gives no hint of notice of the issues raised in the 
Second 1993 Objection and the 1999 Objection. They raise no common issues of fact, 
law, or evidence. 
The unlimited "amendment" of objections, including the raising of new and 
unrelated issues, only circumvents the ninety-day deadline in section 73-4-11. The best 
policy for the vast majority of water users and for the health and progress of the general 
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adjudication is that only issues that are raised in a valid, timely objection may be pursued 
in the general adjudication. 
CONCLUSION 
The ninety-day objection period in section 73-4-11 is a critical part of the statutory 
adjudication process. It allows water users to contest the State Engineer's 
recommendations to the court as to how water rights in an area should be recognized. It 
also places a burden of responsibility on the water users to file within ninety days. The 
statutes and case law require that each recipient of a proposed determination have ninety 
days to object to it, and water users should not be allowed to circumvent the effects of the 
statute by belatedly asking for an extension or creatively labeling a late objection an 
amendment. 
This Court should reverse the trial court decision as a matter of law, and direct the 
trial court to dismiss the Company's objections. 
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Dated this 20th day of January, 2004. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF, No. 4666 
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JULIE I. VALDES, No. 8545 
Assistant Attorneys General 
ATTORNEYS FOR UTAH STATE ENGINEER 
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Utah State Engineer 
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Addendum 1: Memorandum Decision on Utah State Engineer's Motion 
to Dismiss and Claimant, Green River Canal Company's, 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Extend Time for Filing 
Objections 
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IN THE SEVENTH DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO USE 
OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND 
UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE 
DRAINAGE AREA OF GREEN RIVER 
FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF THE 
GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS, 
EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE AREA OF 
THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH 
AREA 91, BOOK 5 
Plaintiff, 
MEMORANDUM DECISION ON UTAH 
STATE ENGINEER'S MOTION TO 
DISMISS AND CLAIMANT, GREEN 
RIVER CANAL COMPANY'S, MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND/OR EXTEND TIME 
FOR FILING OBJECTIONS 
Case No. 690708598 
The Court heard oral arguments on the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss the Green River 
Canal Company's Objections to its Proposed Determination, and Canal Company's Motion in 
Opposition to the State Engineer's Motion to Dismiss and included Motion to Either Extend the 
Deadlines or in the alternative to Dismiss the General Adjudication Complaint herein. Post hearing 
supplemental briefs were also filed and considered. 
Both parties request relief which requires the Court to construe parts or all of two Utah 
statutes, to wit: §73-4-3 UCA which provides in pertinent part as follows: 
" . . . and as soon as this survey has been completed, the state engineer shall file notice of 
completion with the clerk and give notice by registered mail or bv personal service to all 
claimants whose names appear on the list that the survey has been completed", 
and §73-4-11 UCA which provides, again in pertinent part: 
"... After full consideration of the statements of claims, and of the surveys, records, and files, 
and after a personal examination of the river system or water source involved, if such 
examination is deemed necessary, the state engineer shall formulate a report and a proposed 
determination of all rights to the use of the water of such river system or water source, and 
a copy of the same shall be mailed by regular mail to each claimant with notice that any 
claimant dissatisfied therewith may within ninety days from such date of mailing file with the 
clerk of the district court a written objection thereto duly verified on oath. The state engineer 
shall distribute the waters from the natural streams or other natural sources in accordance 
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with the proposed determination or modification thereof by Court order until a final decree 
is rendered by the Court; provided, if the right to the use of said waters has been theretofore 
decreed or adjudicated said waters shall be distributed in accordance with such decree until 
the same is reversed, modified, vacated or otherwise legally set aside". (EMPHASIS MINE) 
The State Engineer claims that Canal Company did not comply with the 90 day limit in §73-4-
11 and further, relies on the language of §73-4-3, which allows any notice required therein to be 
served by registered mail or personal service, to validate his claimed service of Canal Company under 
73-4-11 essentially contending that the alleged acceptance by Delbert Tidwell as evidenced in Exhibit 
A to State Engineers Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, waives the mailing requirements 
of 73-4-11. Contrarily, Canal Company requests this Court strictly construe 73-4-11 and require that 
all claimants receive notice by mail contending that until all claimants receive the necessary notice the 
90 days should not begin to run since to do otherwise places claimants who last receive their notices 
in an unequal position to those who first receive their notices, which they contend this Court should 
not approve. I agree with this construction. 
The facts are not in dispute. 
1. The State Engineer did not mail by regular mail to the Green River Canal Company 
a Notice of Proposed Determination. He claims that the Notice, Receipt, and Waiver 
signed by Tidwell (an alleged agent of this company) vitiates this failure and begins 
the running of the 90 day objection period from the alleged date of the Notice, to wit, 
December 15, 1972. 
2. The Canal Company did not file an objection with the Court or otherwise in the 90 
day period, as that is computed by the State Engineer in his argument, but did file 
"protests" allegedly on June 8, 1973, (Canal Company's contention, see chronology 
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of events) or June 20, 1973, (See State Engineer's Memorandum In Support of 
Motion to Dismiss hereafter MEMO); June 18, 1993 (two separate "objections, 
MEMO; and on October 14, 1999, (MEMO, page 3). 
The Court's understanding and therefore findings are: 
1. The determinations which directly affect the Green River Canal Company herein were 
contained in volumes 5 and 6 of area #91 of the State Engineer's Proposed 
Determination. 
2. All of the Certificates of Mailing on file herein referring to Area #91 include Volumes 
5 and/or 6 and extend from October 24, 1973 to January 10, 1974. . 
3. Some "claimants" are not listed in any mailing certificate but only may be discovered 
by reviewing the various bound volumes of receipt and waivers, again for the various 
volumes and/or areas. 
4. The signed Waivers upon which the State Engineer's Office relies, date from late 
1972 to June 4, 1974 as to Area 91, and early 1979 until August 27, 1979, with 
regards to Area 92. 
5. Neither party was able to explain to my satisfaction either why the State Engineer 
representative accepted Waivers and/or published Notices over the periods alleged or 
why the first Canal Company's protest was not filed within the 90 days as computed 
by the State Engineer. However, both parties rely on the long periods of time which 
have expired as suggesting that reasonable alternatives might exist. 
Both parties request the Court construe the statutes strictly as against the opposing party, but 
not as against them. 
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The Court believes that no benefit is to be anticipated from the Court granting Green River 
Canal Company's motion to extend the time to the present for filing protests, objections, and claims 
nor the alternative motion to dismiss the general determination adjudication from going forward. 
However, the Court believes that in equity as well as according to the law, I can construe the statutes 
to do the least harm possible and by so doing I serve the equitable position that all parties deserve 
their legitimate day in Court, but do not extend and compound the complications alluded to by the 
State Engineer in his arguments which the Court believes are inherent in closing and thereafter re-
opening the general determination proceedings. I therefore deny Green River Canal Company's 
Motion to Dismiss and also their Motion to Extend Time for filing protests, except has hereafter 
stated. 
The Court concludes that the Legislative Scheme was and is purposeful - and the Legislature 
had a reason(s) for drafting the disparate language in the two sections. Clearly, if one objector must 
disclose his objections and they involve another claimants water right, and that other claimant, 
because he has consciously delayed or not picked up or been mailed the Notice, then the latter has 
the advantage of reviewing the earlier objections - the later objector may have information not 
available to the earlier objector which may be either beneficial or detrimental to the earlier objector. 
The Court believes such concerns underscore the Legislature's determination that the Notice be 
mailed to each claimant under §73-4-11 UC A. Such a mailing I believe, would also allow the Notices 
to be received by the claimants/objectors almost contemporaneously, which I believe the legislative 
scheme anticipated. 
If all objectors/claimants are to be treated fairly, then all claimants should have 90 days to 
present their objections under 73-4-11, and I believe that period should be computed using the date 
-4-
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of the last event, either mailing certificate or waiver, which is on file herein which affects each area. 
With regard to area #91,1 conclude that to be June 4,1974, which is the date of the last dated Waiver 
by Joseph Novak. With regard to Area #92, it may be as late as August 27, 1979, the date of Waiver 
of Odell P. Anderson and B.E. Larson using a similar formula for Area 91, but I am not called upon 
to decide that herein. The State Engineer Office's decision to not strictly comply with the statutory 
language does, I believe, allow me legal latitude for this interpretation and I believe equitably 
speaking, the delay in raising the defense which the State Engineer's Office now attempts to raise by 
its' Motion to Dismiss gives me equitable grounds for allowing the proceedings to go forward and 
to treat the Green River Canal's objection as being timely filed and further treating the "supplemental 
filings" by that company as merely amendments and/or specifications to the original filing which I am 
holding was timely filed, that is, before 90 days after June 4, 1974, either June 8th or 20th, 1973. 
The action which the Court takes, I believe confirms the statutory requirements of §73-4-11, 
and yet allows the state engineer to distribute the waters pursuant to the proposed determination until 
a Decree is entered, and will allow both parties to raise the question as to the legitimate amount of 
waters attributable to the Green River Canal Company herein. I realize that this construction or 
interpretation may create some additional problems, but I believe it legally and equitably addresses 
the issues and provides a workable procedure which complies with the Legislative language going 
forward. I believe this interpretation should have only prospective application to the various factual 
circumstances that the State Engineer must accommodate. 
For all of the foregoing reasons the Court denies the State Engineer's Motion of Dismissal 
as well as the Motions to Dismiss made by the Canal Company and denies the Canal Company's 
request for additional time to file claims except to the extent that this Court's interpretation of the 
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statutory scheme allows additional time to file the objection herein. 
Although not before me at this time, it would appear equitable to limit any claim for water by 
the Canal Company to the amount contained in the original statement of water users claim filed 
November 6,1969. If the subsequent objection/amendments to objection increase that amount, to the 
extent that those amounts are increased after the 90 day statutory period, which with regard to area 
91 this Court concludes should be computed from June 4,1974, this Court should be disinclined to 
allow any such broadening of the claim 
J7£ 
/ 
Dated this 7 day ofJanuaiy, 2003 
BY THE COURT: 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that I mailed a signed copy of the foregoing ORDER ON PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
TO DISMISS AND DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AND/OR EXTEND TIME FOR 
FILING OBJECTIONS on the - " T ^ a y of February, 2003, to the following: 
Steven A. Wuthrich 
Counsel for Lee Thayn 
1011 Washington, Suite #102 
Montpelier, ID 83254 
\L. Ward Wagstaff, Esq., Julie I. Valdes, Mark Shurtleff 
Utah Attorney General, Counsel for State Engineer 
1594 W. North Temple, Suite #300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84116 
Gerald H. Kinghorn, Esq. 
Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn, & Peters 
Counsel for Green River City 
185 S. State, Suite #7000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
v
—^Clerk^Deputy Court Clerk 
jyMtM/ 
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Addendum 2: Notice, Receipt and Waiver (Green River Canal 
Company) 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL 
DETERMINATION OF RIGHTS TO THE USE 
OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE AND UNDER-
GROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA OF 
THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE 
AREA OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CON-
FLUENCE OF THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS 
TO THE CONFLUENCE OF THE GREEN AND 
COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING THE DRAINAGE 
AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN UTAH. 
NOTICE 
RECEIPT AND WAIVER 
To all users of water within the above-described drainage area: 
There is hereto attached and herewith served upon you a copy of 
the Proposed Determination of Water Rights for Price River and Lower 
Green River Drainage, as prepared by the State Engineer in the above-
entitled cause. This Proposed Determination will be on file at all times 
with the Clerk of this court in Price, Utah, and copies thereof may be 
obtained from the office of the Division of Water Rights at Salt Lake 
City, Utah, upon payment of the actual cost of the printing thereof; and 
you are notified that any claimant dissatisfied with said Proposed Deter-
mination must file with the Clerk of the above-entitled court a written 
objection thereto duly verified on oath within ninety (90) days from and 
after the date of service of this notice upon you. 
Dated this ^ &&> day of JU( L^ _, 19 7Z< 
Dallin W. Jensen 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for State Engineer 
Hubert C. Lambert 
State Engineer 
442 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
The undersigned, being a water claimant within the above-described 
drainage area and a party to this proceeding, hereby acknowledges receipt 
of the Proposed Determination of Water Rights for Price River and Lower 
Green River Drainage as prepared by the Division of Water Rights of the 
State of Utah. 
Price River Div., Book 1 
Price River Div., Book 2 
Price River Div., Book 3 
Price River Div., Book 4 
) ( Price River Div., Book 5 
j( Price River Div., Book 6 
Lower Green River Division 
And the undersigned waives any further service in connection therewith 
and consents to the entry of a final decree in this cause unless a formal 
protest is made by the undersigned claimant to the above-entitled court 
within ninety (90) days from and after date hereof. 
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Addendum 3: Water User's Claim 92-294 (Proposed Determination of 
Water Rights in the Price River and Lower Green River 
Drainage, Area Code No. 91 Book 5, p. 1143) 
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W.U.C. NO. 294 NAME: Greenriver Canal Company MAP: 144d 
SOURCE: Green River (Gravity Canal) FLOW: (See Period of Use) 
TYPE OF RIGHT: Diligence Claim No. 46 PRIORITY: 1880 
POINT OF DIVERSION: N. 1950 ft. and W. 800 ft. from the SE corner. Sec. 17, T20S, R16E, SLBM. 
PERIOD OF USE: Irrigation: April 1 to October 31: 60.0 cfs* 
Stockwatering & 
Domestic: November 1 to March 31: 20.0 cfs 
PURPOSE, EXTENT & PLACE OF USE: Irrigation: 
9.20 acs. SEy4NEy4, 1.7 acs. NE'^SE1^ Sec. 20, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 7.70 acs. NEVMEV*. 9.00 acs. SEy-NE'A, 6.60 acs. 
SWASEV*, 0.20 ac. NE1/4SE1/4, 24.30 acs. NWy4SE1/4, 0.70 ac. NE'/iSWtt, 27.40 acs. SW%SE%, 23.30 acs. SEy4SW%, Sec. 
29, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 23.00 acs. SEy4NEy4, 28.40 acs. NE1/4SEy4, 1.10 acs. SEy«SE1/4, Sec. 31, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 
4.7 acs. NW'/iNE1/-, 36.00 acs. NEy4NW1/4, 9.30 acs. NWKNWK, 17.70 acs. SE1/4NW1/4, 35.70 acs. S WKNWK, 7.20 acs. 
NWy4SWy4, Sec. 32, T20S, R16E, SLBM; 15.20 acs. Lot 1, 32.50 acs. Lot 2, 45.50 acs. Lot 3, 8.50 acs. Lot 4, 4.60 acs. 
Lot 9, 28.70 acs. Lot 10, 11.80 acs. Lot 11, Sec. 3, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 0.20 ac. Lot 1, 4.20 acs. Lot 16, 20.00 acs. 
Lot 20 (NE%SE%) 0.70 ac. NWASEV*, 36.00 acs. SE1/«SE1/4, 31.80 acs. SWy4SE1/4, 4.10 acs. SE^SW1/*, Sec. 4, T21S, 
R16E, SLBM; 36.00 acs. NE1/4NE1/4, 33.80 acs. NWftiNE'/i, 16.00 acs. NEVMWA, 37.70 acs. SEy4NEy4, 37.50 acs. 
SVnNE'^, 1.10 acs. SEy4NW1/4, 9.70 acs. NWKSEK, 33.50 acs. NWKSEK, 1.70 acs. NE%SW%, 2.80 acs. SE1/4SE1/4, 
27.80 acs. SWKSEK, 9.20 acs. SEKSWK, Sec. 9, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 20.00 acs. NWKNEK, 31.60 acs. NEXNWK, 
39.00 acs. NWXNWX, 33.20 acs SW%NE!4 , 38.60 acs. SEKNWK, 36.20 acs. SW%NW%, 22.70 acs. NWKSEK, 40.00 
acs. NEKSWK, 38.70 acs. NWXSWK. 5.40 acs. SW1/4SE1/4, 34.30 acs. SEXSWK, 25.70 acs. SW'ASW1/*, Sec. 10, 
T21S, R16E, SLBM; 20.70 acs. NE%NW%, 37.60 acs. NW%NW%.0.40 ac. SE%NW%, 5.70 acs. SW14NWK. 8. 50 
acs. NW%SW%, 5.20 acs. SW%SW!4, Sec. 15, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 13.90 acs. NE%NE%, 29.50 acs. NWKNEK, 
4.40 acs. NEVMWA, 29.40 acs. SE%NE%, 16.20 acs. SW%NE%, 22.50 acs. NEUSEK, 28.50 acs. NWKSEK, 2.00 
acs. NE%SW%, Sec. 16, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 35.50 acs. SEKSEX, 26.20 acs. SW%SE1/4, 0.20 acs. SE%SW%, Sec. 
16, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 23.00 acs. NE'ANE1/*, Sec. 21, T21S, R16E, SLBM; 3.50 acs. NW%NW%, 1.40 acs. SW%NW%, 
Sec. 22, T21S, R16E, SLBM, or a total acreage of 1,443.50 acres. 
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 294 
Annual water allowed 5774.00 acre-feet. 
Stockwatering: 2000 cattle, 3000 sheep, 100 horses 
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 294 
Annual water allowed 75.60 acre-feet. 
Domestic: 75 families 
CLAIMS USED FOR PURPOSE DESCRIBED: 294 
Annual water allowed 54.60 acre-feet. 
*From April 1 to October 31, inclusive, flow for stockwatering and domestic is part of flow for irrigation. 
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Addendum 4: 1973 Objection, Green River Canal Company 
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Green River Canal Company 
% Delbert Tidwell, Secretary 
Green River, Utah 84525 
B. H. Young 
Carbon County Clerk 
Carbon County Courthouse 
Price, Utah 84501 
RE: Protest to Proposed Deterrtinrtti^^ 
of Water Rights in the Price River & 
Lower Green River Drainage - Civil 8598 
Dear Mr. Young: 
The Green River Canal Company hereby protests the "Proposed Determination of 
Water Rights in the Price River & Lower Green River Drainage" as submitted by the 
State Engineer to the Seventh Judicial District Court, for the following reasons: 
1. The irrigation period of use is stated to be from April 1 to 
October 31. In the Green River area the period of use is gen-
erally at least 30 days longer than the period of use in the 
Price area. The period of use in the Green River area should 
be at least March 15 to November 15. 
2. Because of the longer growing season and because the tempera-
tures in the Green River area are higher*than the temperatures 
in the Price area, the consumptive use in the Green River area 
is higher than the consumptive use in the Price area. Because 
of the higher consumptive use in the Green River area the duty 
in the Green River area should be at least 5 ac.-ft./ac./yr., 
measured at the farm headgate. 
Sincerely yp^rs, 
ts 
Green River Canal Company 
John Vetere, President 
STATE OF UTAH ) 




foregtfffuj instrument, who duly 
My °fj^/ *" rf , personally appeared before 
, the signer of the 
dged to me that he executed the same. 
(SEAL) 
NOTAfcY PUBLIC 
MY COMMISSION EXPIRES: &Q (J j H ff*?^ 
cc: Division of Water Rights 
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JUH 18 93 
C c i / r i j 
^
V E
^ p S p j C T COURT Si Ale OF UTAH UTAH 
Michael R. Jensen #1685 
FRANDSEN, KELLER, & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company 
90 West 100 North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone 801-637-1245 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER 
IN UTAH 
PROTEST BY GREEN 




Code No, 91 and 92 
Civil No. 8598 
Green River Canal Company hereby makes the following protest of 
the above referenced Proposed Determination of Water Rights by the 
State Engineer: 
1. In the Proposed Determination of Water Rights, page ii, 
paragraph 5, the State Engineer concludes: "In the instance of 
irrigation, the diversion requirements have been considered to be 
4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year, regardless of the source 
of supply." 
2. All of the irrigation water rights represented in the 
Proposed Determination of Water Rights have been given a diversion 
duty of 4.00 acre feet per acre per calendar year, using alfalfa as a 
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s t a n d a r d , i n c l u d i n g Green R i v e r Canal Company's w a t e r r i g h t u n d e r 9 1 -
294 . 
3 . The 4 . 0 0 a c r e f e e t d i v e r s i o n d u t y i s i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r the 
Green R i v e r a r e a / a s e v i d e n c e d by a l e t t e r d a t e d F e b r u a r y 19 / 1993 
from Anthony B e a l s / S o i l C o n s e r v a t i o n i s t f o r t he S o i l C o n s e r v a t i o n 
S e r v i c e , to Ted E k k e r ; P r e s i d e n t of the Green R i v e r Cana l Company. 
A copy of s a i d l e t t e r i s a t t a c h e d h e r e t o a s E x h i b i t A, and by 
r e f e r e n c e made a p a r t h e r e o f . 
4 . D i v e r s i o n d u t y fo r i r r i g a t i o n w a t e r r i g h t s in t h e Green 
R i v e r arear i n c l u d i n g Green R i v e r Canal Company's w a t e r r i g h t under 
91 -294 / s h o u l d be s e t a t 6 .00 a c r e f e e t pe r a c r e p e r c a l e n d a r y e a r . 
DATED t h i s day of J u n e , 1 9 9 3 . 
FRANDSEN, KELLER &^JENSEN 
^ ^ wr/i/c 
Michae l R. J e n s e n 
A t t o r n e y s fo r Gryeefa R i v e r Cana l Company 
Green R i v e r Cana l Company 
P .O . Box 211 
Green River, Utah 84525 
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: ss 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
Ted Ekker, being first duly sworn on oath/ deposes and says: 
That he is the President of Green River Canal Company; that he 
has read the foregoing instrument and knows the contents thereof/ and 
that the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge except 
as to matters therein stated upon information and belief/ and as to 
such matters believes them to be true. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /# day of June/ 1993. 
NOTARY PUBLIC-" 
My Commission E^ices^S A?%, *\ 
Residing a 
LI£0 y-s 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally a copy of the foregoing 
Protest by Green River Canal Company to Proposed Determination of 
Water Rights this / ^ day of^ -? 1993 to: Mark P. Page, 
Regional Engineer for State Engineer, 453 South Carbon Avenue, P.O. 
Box 718, Price, Utah 84501-0718-
ytM 
Michael R. Jensen 
At torney for Green Bfiver Canal Company 
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jf^/iib/6 /{ 
UNITED STATES SOIL 350 NORTH 400 EAST 
DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION PRICE, UTAH 34501 
AGRICULTURE SERVICE 
\ 
February 19, 1993 
Dear Mr. Ekker: 
You asked far information regarding consumptive use in the 
Green River area so that you could respond to a letter from 
the State Engineers office regarding adjudication of water 
rights. The letter stated that alfalfa was used as the 
reference crop and a figure of Z acft/ac was necessary for 
growing alfalfa in most places in the state. The letter 
further stated that an irrigation efficiency of 50% was 
assumed and so 4 acft/ac was a standard allocation. 
In the Green River area our data shows that 3.4 acft/ac is 
needed to grow alfalfa. Taking out effective precipitation 
reduces this amount to 3 acft/ac. Assuming 50% irrigation 
efficiency, an allocation 6 acft/ac would be necessary for 
growing alfalfa. 
Sincerely, 
Anthony D. Beals 
So iI Conservat i on i st 
P.S. I have enclosed information on financial assistance 
from Utah State Board of Water Resources. 
cc Mark Page 
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Addendum 6: Second 1993 Objection, Green River Canal Company 
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fpS» g r. 
J/.-20 £ if. *C.2> rar-v ;.- f. s> 
. r3 M 
JUS 18 93 
S£y£ i»&cow" 
Michael R. Jensen #1685 
FRANDSEN, KELLER, & JENSEN 
Attorneys for Green River Canal Company 
90 West 100 North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Telephone 801-637-1245 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR CARBON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE PRICE RIVER AND OF THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER 
IN UTAH 
PROTEST BY GREEN 




Code No. 91 and 92 
Civil No. 8598 
Green River Canal Company hereby makes the following protest of 
the above referenced Proposed Determination of Water Rights by the 
State Engineer: 
1. Green River Canal Company, under Water Right 91-294, holds 
the earliest priority (year 1890) water right on the West side of the 
Green River at the following point of diversion: 
North 1950 feet and West 800 feet from the Southeast Corner 
of Section 17, Township 20 South, Range 16 East, Salt Lake 
Base and Meridian. 
2. Green River City, under Water Right 91-39, makes claim to 
220 second feet of water for power generation purposes at the same 
Ipoint of diversion described above. 
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3 . Green R i v e r C i t y ' s c l a i m and w a t e r r i g h t under 9 1 - 3 9 s h o u l d 
be d e c l a r e d i n v a l i d , b e c a u s e Green R i v e r C i t y has f a i l e d t o a p p l y the 
w a t e r to b e n e f i c i a l u s e ; and h a s n ' t u s e d the w a t e r r i g h t f o r t h e u s e 
a p p l i e d f o r s i n c e t h e 1 9 2 0 s o r 1 9 3 0 s , 
DATED t h i s fa - day o f J u n e , 1 9 9 3 . 
FRAUJDSEN, KELLER & >J£NSEN 
Green R i v e r Canal Company 
P . O . Box 211 
Green R i v e r , Utah 84525 
M i c h a e l R. Je 




STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss 
COUNTY OF CARBON ) 
Ted Ekker, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
That he is the President of Green River Canal Company; that he 
has read the foregoing instrument and knows the contents thereof, and 
that the same is true and correct to the best of his knowledge except 
as to matters therein stated upon information and belief, and as to 
such matters believes them to be true. 
&&. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /£ vday of June, 1993. 
NOTARY PUBLIC/ 
'-=••>/.•* ?*tjrj-\ My Commission E x p i r e s - »£•&* 
Residing mt^Les ~j/2£j6 
***£*& 
"&*, 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I personally a copy of the foregoing 
Protest by Green River Canal Company to Proposed Determination of 
Water Rights this f 0'— day of
 /><p/yi^ , 1993 to: Mark P. Page, lis (]f_~ day o f sjp?1^-
Regional Engineer for S t a t e Engineer , 453 South Carbon Avenue, P.O. 
Box 718, P r i c e , Utah 8 4 5 0 1 - 0 7 1 8 . 
w^^^\^ 
lichael R. Jensen 
Attorney for Gre ver Canal Company 
3 
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Addendum 7: 1999 Objection, Green River Canal Company 
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J. Craig Smith (4143) 
David B. Hartvigsen (5390) 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 





IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
CARBON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
IN THE MATTER OF THE GENERAL DETERMINATION 
OF RIGHTS TO THE USE OF WATER, BOTH SURFACE 
AND UNDERGROUND, WITHIN THE DRAINAGE AREA 
OF THE GREEN RIVER FROM THE CONFLUENCE OF 
THE PRICE AND GREEN RIVERS TO THE CONFLUENCE 
OF THE GREEN AND COLORADO RIVERS EXCLUDING 
THE DRAINAGE AREA OF THE SAN RAFAEL RIVER IN 
UTAH 
SUPPLEMENTAL PROTEST BY 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY TO 
THE PROPOSED DETERMINATION 
OF WATER RIGHTS 
CodeNos. 91 and 92 
Civil No. 8598 
Green River Canal Company ("Canal Company"), by and through its counsel, J. Craig Smith 
and David B. Hartvigsen of Nielsen & Senior, hereby supplements its earlier protests against the 
Proposed Determination of Water Rights filed by the State Engineer in the above referenced matter. 
The Canal Company objects to the Proposed Determination's recommendation concerning the Canal 
Company's Water User Claim No. 91-294 on page 1143 of the Proposed Determination, wherein 
it incorrectly assumes in a footnote that the claim for 60 cfs of irrigation water during the irrigation 
season is inclusive of the Canal Company's claim for 20 cfs for stockwater on a year-round basis. 
In support of this objection, the Canal Company offers the following: 
1. The Canal Company's Statement of Water User's Claim filed in this action on or 
about November 6,1969 contains nothing that would suggest that the stockwater claim is included 
within the irrigation claim during the irrigation season. In fact, the opposite is true. The Water 
User's Claim includes a claim for year-round domestic water and lists its quantity as "inc." 
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• • 
(included), clearly indicating that it was part of the 20 cfs of water for stockwatering. No such "inc." 
language is used with respect to either the stockwatering during the irrigation season. The Canal 
Company's Diligence Claim filed on June 18,1952, upon which its Water User Claim in this action 
is based, similarly asserts a right to 20 cfs for stockwatering on a year-round basis and an additional 
60 cfs for irrigation during the irrigation season. 
2. This canal is rather unique in its characteristics and operation requirements due to the 
high sediment loads and siltation problems associated with diverting water from the Green River, 
the very flat terrain traversed by the canal, and the elevations of the individual diversions from the 
canal. It must operate at full capacity, i.e., at 80 cfs as it has for the past century, in order to function 
properly. It has never operated at 60 cfs during the irrigation season and could not do so. 
Difficulties in delivering water to individual shareholders are encountered whenever it gets below 
80 cfs, as verified by measurements conducted by both Jack Barnett, P.E., and Mike ReMillard this 
past summer. Although much of the 80 cfs is not used for irrigation or stockwatering, it is required 
as carrier water to deliver the irrigation and stock water to the high diversion points on the canal 
system and to carry away the large sediment loads. This carrier water is all returned to the Green 
River via numerous sluice gates along the length of the canal and at the tail end of the canal. The 
20 cfs diverted during the off season is similarly required to deliver a fraction thereof for 
stockwatering purposes in the non-irrigation season to a portion of the Canal Company's 
shareholders. 
3. The Green River Canal Company is presently involved in litigation with the only 
other party who uses the same point of diversion from the Green River as the Canal Company over 
that party's claimed right to use the Canal Company's point of diversion and diversion facilities. 
See Green River Canal Company v. Lee Thayn, Civil No. 95-070-6174, Seventh Judicial District 
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Court, the Honorable Bryce Bryner presiding. The Court has directly addressed the relative quantity 
and priority issues of the parties and has issued an order on March 13,1999, establishing the Canal 
Company's rights under this water right, i.e., Water Right No./Water User's Claim No. 91-294, to 
be 80 cfs during the irrigation season and that said water right is the senior right at these diversion 
facilities on the Green River. A copy of that order is attached hereto. 
For these reasons, the Canal Company objects to the footnote on page 1143 in the Proposed 
Determination that assumes that 20 cfs of stockwatering water is included within the Canal 
Company's claim for 60 cfs during the irrigation season, which would effectively reduce the Canal 
Company's diversion rights during the irrigation season from 80 cfs to 60 cfs total and would render 
the canal system incapable of delivering irrigation water to all of its shareholders which it has 
historically been able to do. Therefore, the Proposed Determination should be amended as to Water 
User Claim No. 91-294 by eliminating the note at the end thereof on page 1143 so as to restore the 
Canal Company's total diversion right to 80 cfs during the irrigation season and 20 cfs during the 
remainder of the year. 
DATED this 13th day of October, 1999. 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
J. Craig Smith (^ 
David B. Hartvigsen 
Protestant's Address: 
Green River Canal Company 
c/o Tim Vetere, President 
P. O. Box 404 
Green River, Utah 84525 
98582 .GR255 .001 3 
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o< 
J. Craig Smith, USB No. 4143 
David B. Hartvigsen, USB No. 5390 
Daniel J. McDonald, USB No. 7935 
NIELSEN & SENIOR, P.C 
1100 Eagle Gate Tower 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 532-1900 
Facsimile: (801) 532-1913 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Green River Canal Company 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR EMERY COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
GREEN RIVER CANAL COMPANY, a Utah 




ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT ON ITS EIGHTH AND 
NINTH CAUSES OF ACTION 
ENJOINING DEFENDANT FROM 
INTERFERING WITH PLAINTIFF'S 
PRIOR RIGHT TO USE OF WATER 
AND STRIKING THE AFFIDAVIT 
OF LEON THAYN 
Civil No. 6174 
Judge Bryce K. Bryner 
The Court having reviewed and considered the Memoranda, Exhibits and Affidavits filed for 
and in opposition to Plaintiff Green River Canal Company's ("Green River") Motion for Summary 
Judgment on its Eighth and Ninth Causes of Action, and Motion to Strike the Affidavit of Leon 
Thayn, and having considered the arguments of J. Craig Smith of Nielsen & Senior, who appeared" 
and argued the motions on behalf of Green River Canal Company, and the arguments of Reed 
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Martineau of Snow, Christensen and Martineau, who appeared and argued against the motions on 
behalf of Defendant Lee Thayn ("Thayn") at the hearing conducted on February 26,1999, the Court 
does hereby ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as follows: 
8*- L Green River's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted on its Eighth and Ninth 
Causes of Action. 
2. Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first eighty (80) 
cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and 
diversion facilities of Green River during the inigation season, March 1st through November 15th 
of each year. 
3. Green River holds first priority to divert and place into its canal the first twenty (20) 
cubic feet per second of water diverted by the low dam and diverted through the raceway and 
diversion facilities of Green River during the non-inigation season, November 16th through 
February 28 of each year, . . . . 
The right of Thayn to divert and take water is subsequent and junior to Green River's 
right to the eighty (80) cubic feet per second during the inigation season and twenty (20) cubic feet 
per second during the balance of the year as set forth herein. 
5. In the event that Green River is not receiving its entire water right as set forth herein, 
Thayn shall not divert or take any water, 
6. Thayn is permanently enjoined from encroaching upon or interfering with Green 
River's right to divert eighty (80) cubic feet per second of water into its canal during the irrigation 
season, and twenty (20) cubic feet per second during the balance of the year. 
061S.GJU55.001 
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0 7. The priority of the diversion of water and the quantity of Green River's right are 
enforceable by the powers of this Court to enforce injunctions issued by this Court. 
8. The Affidavit of Leon Thayn submitted in opposition to Summary Judgment is 
stricken as hearsay, and as attempting to controvert facts previously admitted by Thayn. 
DATED this {jfe£. day of March, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
}
^C/OL 
HonoraWe Bryce K. bryner 
EKstriCTCourt Judge 
90618.GR255.001 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Addendum 8: Hicken v. North Field Ditch Company, No. 960360-CA 
(Utah Ct. App. Mar. 20,1997) (unpublished memorandum 
decision) 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
MAR 2 0 mi 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Ruby W. Hicken, Thomas F. 
Hicken, and John T. Hicken, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
North Ditch Irrigation 
Company, Clayton Gardner, and 
Robert Gappmayer, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 960360-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 20, 1997) 
Fourth D i s t r i c t , Heber Department 
The Honorable Guy R. Burningham 
Attorneys: Steven E. Clyde, Stephen B. Doxey, Amanda D. Seegsr , 
and Lynda R. Krause, Sa l t Lake City, for Appel lants 
Richard C. Skeen, David L. Arrington, and Bradley R. 
Cahoon, Salt Lake City , for Appel lees 
Before Judges Davis, Bench,, and~Jackson. 
BENCH, Judge: 
The 1960 findings state that plaintiffs had used the water 
"to irrigate lawn, garden and pasture." Relying on this finding, 
plaintiffs contend that only irrigation rights were at issue in 
the 1960 litigation. Because the findings are arguably ambiguous 
on this point, plaintiffs are entitled to the inference that 
stockwatering rights were not at issue in 1960. See Educators 
Mut. Ins. Ass'n v. Allied Property & Cas. Ins. Co.. 890 P;2d 
1029, 1029-30 (Utah 1995) (stating that on review of a trial 
court's dismissal for failure to state a claim, court views all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff). 
We conclude, however, that any ambiguity in the findings or 
decree was clarified by the 1984 proposed determination in the 
general adjudication. The proposed determination, a copy of 
which was attached to plaintiffs' complaint, states that 
plaintiffs' water rights are based on the 1960 decree and 
diligence claim. Plaintiffs' water user's claim, which was filed 
during the general adjudication, also refers to the 1960 decree 
and diligence claim. The proposed determination provides that 
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plaintiffs1 claim "is limited to 2/240 interest" in the flow of 
water, "which is intermittently diverted by" the claims of 
plaintiffs and defendants. It then clearly defines the purposes 
of plaintiffs' "2/240 interest": 3.80 acre-feet of water for 
irrigation and 1.01 acre-feet of water for year-round 
stockwatering. Therefore, the proposed determination 
unambiguously shows that plaintiffs have a year-round 
stockwatering right that, together with the irrigation right, is 
limited to a 2/240 interest in the flow of water. Cf
 r Provo 
River Water Users' Ass'n v. Morgan. 857 P.2d 927, 931 (Utah 1993) 
(concluding ambiguity in decree rendered it unlikely that all 
rights were decided in prior adjudication) ; Orderville TnHgatinn 
Co, Yi Glendale Irrigation Co., 17 Utah 2d 282, 285, 409 p.2d 
616, 619 (1965) (stating res judicata does not bar action to 
determine water rights "where there are uncertainties" in a prior 
decree). 
Plaintiffs did not object to the proposed determination 
within ninety days of service, as required under Utah Code Ann, 
§ 73-4-11 (1989). See Murdock v. Sprinoville Mun. Corp.. 878 
P.2d 1147, 1150 (Utah 1994). Therefore, because the-proposed 
determination shows that plaintiffs' stockwatering claim was 
previously adjudicated, they cannot prevail on their present 
cause of action. £££. Green River Adiud. v. United States. 17 
Utah 2d 50, 52, 404 P.2d 251, 252 (1965) (emphasizing res 
judicata applicable to general adjudications of water rights). 
The trial court therefore properly dismissed plaintiff's 
complaint. See Baker v. Angus, 910 P.2d 427, 430 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) ...(-.stating.dismissal, prjoper-^ only if the plaintiffs are not 
entitled to-relief "under the facts alleged or under any set of 
facts they could prove to support their claim"). 
Affirmed. 
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